the Ethiopia-Eritrea border démarcation and on the normalisation of relations between the two countries, which starled in 2001, have been precarious and slow. In mid-2003, there were still ongoing disagreements about the border lines, despite the judgement given on April 13, 2002 by the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC) of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague that was mandated by the two countries.
1 Ethiopia contested the décision concerning its western front, and the controversy has raged on following a new statement by the EEBC published on March 21,2003. 2 An equally tenacious issue may prove to be that of claims for war damage compensation, brought by local résidents and businesses in the former war zone and by the two governments. The international Community has supported the United Nations Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), in place since October 2000, and until now the 'Temporary Security Zone' along the two provisional borders has remained relatively calm during the présence of this mission. The massive drought and famine that affected both countries in 2002-3 makes them hésitant to escalate the issue, but Ethiopia's misgivings have increased markedly because the EEBC statement appears to have awarded the contested village of Badme to Eritrea (Abbink 2003) . In tins paper I contend that the threat of regional instability by proxy conflict remains, as the two regimes in power in Ethiopia and Eritrea -led by the two former insurgent movements, the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratie Front (EPRDF) 3 and the Populär Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) (until 1994 officially called the Eritrean People's Liberation Front or EPLF) 4 are unlikely to make a real peace with each other. Neither have they solved any of the underlying causes of their problematic political and economie relationship since 1991 (when the former Mengistu reghne was defeated): issues concerning trade, communications, transborder movements of labourers and pastoralists, the outstanding bank debts (especially of Eritrea to Ethiopia's banking system), goods and property in Assab port destined for Ethiopia and confiscated by Eritrea, Ethiopian military hardware given 'on loan' to Eritrea well before the war, legal issues relating to ethnie groups in both countries, citizenship, environmental Problems, water-sharing, and so on. Ethiopia, and especially the population of the 'front luie' regional state of Tigray, experienced the war as an incompréhensible stab in the back by their erstwhile (Eritrean) allies in the struggle against the Mengistu regime. In this context of deep tension and distrust generated by a war that brought serious internai dissent and threatened the power of the reigning elites (Paulos 2001; Plaut 2001) , the danger of proxy wars appears to be permanent.
In the context of the Horn of Africa, I defïne proxy wars as being secondary, often 'low intensity' armed conflicts, pursued in the context of a major geopolitical power struggle or an outright war between states, carried out by subsidiary or co-opted insurgent movements, usually of an ethno-regional nature. These movements can get leverage with the governments on whose support they depend when they are led by aspiring but socially blocked elites from 'minority groups' from neglected or secondary régions, who attempt to make a local bid for power or exert domestic political and military pressure on the central governments, both the foreign one and the one supporting them. The movements, while usually eentred around self-appointed leaders with an elite outlook, have varying degrees of populär support, based on local grievances or feelings of neglect. Their record, however, is very mixed. Some groups have authentic grassroots origins and can bolster legitimate claims to represent the concerns of local populations. But most of them have only a tenuous support base and tend to revert to armed struggle without a clear agenda of positive change and also revert to the use of terror and 'ethnie cleansing' (to use that terrible concept). They often prey upon their own people (Mkandawire 2002) . One depressing example hère is the Lord's Resistance Army in the Sudan-Uganda border area, operating against Uganda (or rather Ugandan civilians) and opportunistically supported by the Sudanese government. Other movements are pure créations of a patron state (the initial founding of Renamo (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) in Mozambique is a good example). What seems clear is that although they may bring some short-term military gains, proxy wars, by provoking a militarisation of daily life and rebounding state repression, are potentially quite destructive of local societies, and thus may become a source of long-term instability and insecurity.
In the Horn of Africa proxy wars, of course, have a long history. In Sudanese-Ethiopian relations before the fall of the Mengistu regime in 1991, there was Ethiopian support for the South. Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), while the Sudan government in turn was involved with providing facilities and supply-lines to the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF and later EPLF) fighting against the Ethiopian government. In the late 1970s and 1980s, President Siyad Barre of Somalia supported the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia, while Ethiopia later supported the northern Somalis in what is now Somaliland against Siyad.
5 Similar patterns occurred with the Afar people in Djibouti and Ethiopia. In recent years, Sudan supported the Eritrean Islamic Jihad while Eritrea has given facilities to the Sudanese opposition National Democratie Alliance (NDA).
The other concept, suggested by the title of this paper, 'lasting peace', is a cherished term in international diplomacy, but is to my mind a very tenuous, if not fictitious, one in the Horn of Africa. In général, a lasting peace is difficult to achieve anywhere in an unequal globalising world that sees an intensification of antagonisms and conflicts around resources and 'identities'. But certainly in a volatile and vulnérable région like the Horn its chances are slim. Especially here, the problem is that state (re)formation is never finished: it will produce persistent conflicts on the basis of material, political and other compétition. The most one can hope for in current conditions of ecological fragility, ethno-regional tensions, state authoritarianism and political unreliability is a manageable state of 'no armed conflict', and the graduai development of a wider regional conflict-resolution structure, to be developed within the international system and linked to better donor-country development efforts.
One crucial instance that brought the phenomenon of proxy wars very clearly into focus was the interférence of Ethiopia and Eritrea in Somalia during their recent war (Abbink 1998; Battera 2001; Tekeste and Tronvoll 2000) . The various examples of proxy war efforts in the Horn show that the central Ethiopian and Eritrean governments will always try to co-opt or direct (and eventually neutralise) such movements and make them instruments of their foreign policy. While in African terms these two regimes are relatively strong, although not necessarily accepted as fully legitimate by the population, the proxy war strategy is a very risky business because some proxy groups are unpredictable, may go out of control, and may constrain a country's foreign policy options. Nevertheless, proxy war is an important and enduring feature of the political dynamics of the Horn. Foreign donor institutions and diplomats tend to underestimate this dimension of covert politics and political manipulation and for the most part trust or rely too much on central government rhetoric.
Héritage of Conflict: The Post-War Situation in the Horn
As noted above, the situation along the Ethio-Eritrean border since the December 2000 peace agreement is relatively calm: there have been no serious incidents, no battles, no imminent threats of renewed hostilities. This is largely due to the shock of the Eritrean defeat in mid-2000 and the very precarious economie situation in both countries, 6 coupled with persistent food insecurity. The most recent drama was the famine in both countries in late 2002 and early 2003 7 that reduced the overall harvest by some 15 per cent from a 'normal' year 8 and put around 13 million people in need of food aid. Famine and persistent economie problems threaten the relative stäbility of the area, also along the new border, because vulnérable and starving people not only migrate in large numbers but also give support to alternative politico-military forces whenever they have the chance. For instance, populär rural support for the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in thé 1980s grew markedly owing to its offers of food relief that thé central Ethiopian government could not or would not deliver. In thé short run, therefore, such problems of food scarcity and économie distress enhance thé support for local movements of protest or rébellion.
The December 2000 agreement has frozen the military situation and led to a release of most prisoners of war, to de-mining opérations, and to a return of displaced people on both sides; but thé truce and thé subséquent negotiations hâve not contributed to meeting thé challenges of 'normalisation' between thé two countries, and they hâve not resolved thé alleged cause of the dispute: thé border line.
There is also continued tension in both countries at the highest political level, as witness thé émergence of serious internai criticism and even divisions within leading opposition parties -TPLF in Ethiopia (Paulos 2002) and PFDJ (Populär Front for Democracy and Justice) in Eritrea.
9 These home opposition groups (apart from thé many diaspora opposition groups, all with their own websites) against thé current leadership represent a very serious challenge. But they hâve been sidelined by a combination of arrests, repression and social ostracism of an amazing kind. Seeing both leaders acting in such a repressive manner against their comrades-in-arms revealed for many thé undemocratic nature of both ré-gimes and recalled thé Leninist model and practice of political party organisation.
In Eritrea tensions now seem to be most serious and may eventually have a wider impact. The president there shows no intention of honouring the constitution, of opening up the political system (for example, by élections, indefinitely postponed), of allowing dissenting voices or even critica! debate questioning bis own rôle. Problems within the Eritrean armed forces are also heard, with frequent commander changes and occasional tension between units. In September 2001 an armed clash occurred, apparently between two front units in Barentu, one of which was then quickly transferred to western Eritrea. 10 The démobilisation of (part of) the 250 000 or so Eritrean troops was constantly delayed in 2001-2 because the leadership feared that the impact of the returning troops to Asmara, for example, might foei the ground swell for political reform. On the Ethiopian side this sparked fears that Eritrea might start a diversionary armed clash with Ethiopia in the Temporary Security Zone.
In Ethiopia, domestic problems such as tensions in the political system, a failing economy, the constant food insecurity, the 2002-3 famine, the faulty justice system, and the unrest and deep resentment in parts of the Oromiya, Somali and the Southern Peoples régions, are far from being resolved. The position of the prime minister, also chief of the TPLF/EPRDF, has come under fire especially since the great rift within the TPLF party that occurred in the spring of 2002. But in fact it has been strengthened in the past two years with a new network of loyal supporters. A more autocratie approach seems to be in the making, as evident from the 2003 reorganisation of the leading party and its constituent parts.
11 A new power formation seems to have emerged, dependent less on the old TPLF party than on loyalists in the civil service, the army and the bureaucracy, and on the other (restructured) parties in the EPRDF coalition. A stable institutional political structure that will survive the current regime has not yet been achieved.
Furthermore, the negotiation process between Ethiopia and Eritrea on both the border issue and compensation for war damages (for example, of local communities) is proceeding very slowly. As of Spring 2003, more than two years after thé peace accord, there are no clear-cut agreements on thé exact borders of the Temporary Security Zone, 12 on free corridors and unrestricted UNMEE movement, on thé présence of militias, and on the return of all civilian populations. Many incidents of unauthorised entrance into thé Temporary Security Zone have been reported in récent years, and also several exchanges of fire between Eritrean and Ethiopian units in late 2002. For the UNMEE-led Military Coordination Commission, thé situation is very time-consuming and taxing. One can imagine that future memoirs of participants such as thé UNMEE force commander and thé spécial représentative of the UN secretary-general will expose thé tricks and stalling tactics of both sides. The first force commander, P. Cammaert, was boycotted by Ethiopia from mid-2002 until the end of his contract in October 2002, owing to an incident with a group of journalists who visited thé disputed village of Badme from thé Eritrean side without notifying thé Ethiopians. The latter saw this location as undisputedly under Ethiopian administration and held Cammaert responsible for thé affront.
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After criticism from Ethiopia on the April 2002 décision, thé border issue was further debated in Border Commission meetings and consultations in late 2002 and early 2003. Whatever thé final outcome, however, unanimous acceptance from both sides is unlikely. Neutral experts were expected to résolve thé border démarcation problem, 14 but it is doubtful whether political pressures could at all be avoided or unambiguous answers to problems of démarcation found. Bowing to pressure, on thé other hand, might lead to unhealthy compromise and to thé subverting of any durability of the peace agreement. Apart from Badme village, another contentieus issue is thé status of thé Irob area. The border of this area around the town of Alitena was never clearly or definitively demarcated, and the treaties or accords of 1896 and 1900 (and the additional 'Notes', sometimes also called 'Treaties ', of 1902 and 1908) are rather ambiguous (Larebo 2000) . From the available évidence so far, 15 the Irob people tend to identify themselves as Ethiopians. They were in any case always under Etbiopian administration. The scorched-earth war policy and the wholesale repression in Irob-land by Eritrean occupying troops after May 1998 has not won the population over to the Eritrean side. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) décision of April 2002, however, divided the Irob région between Eritrea and Ethiopia without any recourse to the principle of self-determination or even consultation with the local population (see pp.52-4, p.99 and the facing map of the PCA décision, cited in note 1). This bas evoked serious protests (see note 15), and indicates the instability to come.
In view of these enduring problems of border démarcation, foreign policy mistakes and deep political tension resulting from the war, neither the government in Asmara nor in Addis Ababa would mourn a regime change in their opponent. In this context, the 'proxy war' strategy has been an option since May 1998. This paper does not address all the international dimensions of the conflict, such as the involvement of the US, Yemen, Sudan, Libya or Egypt, 16 but outlines something of what it meant for the countries immediately involved.
Insurgent Movements and Proxy War
The proxy war strategy was pursued by both players in the devastating war of 1998-2000 between Ethiopia and Eritrea, not only in the enemy country but also in neighbouring states such as Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti and Sudan. In this strategy, Ethiopia has worked through two kinds of insurgent movements: (a) those organisations entirely set up by Ethiopia itself. These have had a very limited impact and will not be discussed here. Among these are the Eritrean Revolutionary Democratie Front (the former Demahai, or Democratie Movement for the Liberation of Eritrea) and the Afar Red Sea Democratie Front (founded in 1998). There may be a few more in the offing; (b) those already existing and having some basis in pre-existing rebellions in Eritrea and Somalia. Here we have the ELF and its varions factions (Central Command, Revolutionary Command, National Command), one Kunama movement and one Afar movement, the Afar Revolutionary Democratie Unity Front (ARDUF). In Somalia, Ethiopia has allied itself with, and has used, several groups that opposed the warlords and later the transitional Somali government in Mogadishu, as well as the Islamist al-Ittihad, then linked with the Bin Laden al-Qaeda network 17 and making incursions into southern Ethiopia in 1996-8. But in 2001-2 Ethiopia again backed some of the warlords to form a local front against the Transitional National Government of Somalia in part of Mogadishu, installed with UN support and financial help from several Arab countries after a Somali reconciliation conference in Arta, Djibouti.
The Eritreans have used existing organisations or fronts, with some of which (such as the Oromo Liberation Front and Ogaden National Liberation Front) they already had long-standing contact, 18 and have intensified relations with Somali groups (especially warlord militias) opposing the Rahanwein and the Ethiopia-backed groups in the Baidoa, Beledweyn and Bakool areas along the border. There are also indications that they shipped weapons to Somalia's Transitional National Government in Mogadishu. 19 As far as the Islamist threat was concerned, the United States, the backer of both new regimes in Ethiopia and Eritrea after 1991, tacitly approved of both countries taking measures against these Islamist groups and containing the Islamist government in Sudan. Ethiopia recently admitted that it had actively interfered in Somalia. 20 In Eritrea, Islande extremists based in Sudan (such as the Eritrean Islamic Jihad) had actively sought to undermine Eritrea's government and déstabilise the région, with the support of Sudan's Islamist regime.
The same policy was in place for Somalia, especially since the 1998 terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi (with 228 people dead, 210 of them Kenyans), where Islamists linked to Somalia and Bin Laden's terror network were involved. The Islamist groups in Somalia were combated with some success, but the overall strategy feil apart after May 1998 with the Ethio-Eritrean war.
The most critical period of proxy war was, of course, during the recent Eritreo-Ethiopian war, especially in 1999 when there was a major upsurge of Ethiopian and Eritrean interférence in Somalia. Before this date, Ethiopia had already perceived an emerging security threat on its borders from al-Ittihad al-Islami in Somalia and had acted against it. The Eritrean government started to back anti-Ethiopian Somali and Oromo armed groups (OLF, ONLF, perhaps al-Ittihad) in a disintegrating Somalia. 21 It is a matter of bistorical record that especially after Febraary 1999 Eritrea began to push the OLF to act against Ethiopia and to import large quantities of arms for 'allies' in Somalia, 22 notably some warlord groups, in an effort to open an additional southern front in the war against Ethiopia. This effort failed rather dramatically, because Ethiopia contained the threat. The OLF, which had held a congress in Mogadishu in 1998, did not make much headway either, and allied with the wrong people in a bid to gain more legitimacy (for example with the warlord Hussein M. Farah). Many Ethiopians, and certainly most of the government and independent media, saw its stance against Ethiopia in the war as a historical mistake if not 'treason'.
Ethiopia supported its own small Eritrean insurgent movement (Demahai) but started to back more significant Eritrean opposition movements gathered in the Alliance of Eritrean National Forces -for example, giving them free access to thé occupied areas in May and June 2000 after thé big offensive in western Eritrea. However, thé Ethiopians did not entirely tell them what to do. 23 Thèse opposition groups had to leave again when thé Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was signed on June 18, 2000. Before 1998 both governments suppressed the Afar movement ARDUF, which opposes the division of the Afar people into two states and was against both Ethiopian and Eritrean policy, but in the war the Ethiopians briefly supported the movement. After December 2000, ARDUF was again dropped by Ethiopia. About the Kunama movements in or outside Eritrea, little is known. They do not seem to pose a threat of armed résistance or rébel-lion. The Ethiopian government allowed Kunama refugees and community leaders to cross its borders. 24 At least 4000 Kunama now live in northern Ethiopia near the war zone.
As to Djibouti, during the war the Ethiopian government accused Eritrea 25 of "seeking to déstabilise Djibouti by planting mines and promoting insecurity along the northern borders of Djibouti". The Afar opposition movement Front pour la Restauration de l'Unité et de la Démocratie (FRUD) was probably supported and armed by the Eritrean government in 1998 (Gilkes 1999) . But apart from attacks on some ourposts and road convoys and planting land mines they did not achieve much. Ethiopia has assisted Djibouti in suppressing the FRUD movement since late 1998. However, FRUD probably made a serious error of judgement in entering into an alliance with the Eritreans, because in the end it weakened their position in Djibouti. Ethiopia (being a landlocked country) will not take any risks with Djibouti whose port is a major life-line, and especially since the port of Assab was ceded to Eritrea and boycotted since the start of the war in May 1998.
Possible Impact of Proxy Wars
The above picture makes it clear that during the 1998-2000 war the two parties used all means, including that of covert proxy war, to gain the upper hand. Neighbouring countries (notably Somalia and Kenya, but also Djibouti and Sudan) feit the fall-out of the war, as well as the active interférence of the two adversaries in local affairs.
However, since the formal end of the war in June 2000, the activity of these various movements and fronts (see Appendix) appeared to decrease despite the fact that in the post-war situation some organisations continued with their opérations. It is not clear whether they still operate with any substantial support from their sponsor country. OLF and ONLF (the outlawed branch) keep an armed présence and carry out small-scale attacks in Ethiopia. OLF moved to Kenya after the debacle in Somalia and is sometimes pursued there by the Ethiopians. At the same time the Kenyan authorities, because of the border areas becoming very unstable, tolerate it less and less. ONLF activity was at its height in 1999-2000, with kidnappings, ambushes, and attacks on EPRDF garrisons. In 2000-2 its activities were reduced, although they are still kidnapping relief workers and hampering the famine relief efforts in the Somali région of Ethiopia.
But incidents with other insurgent groups continue to occur. On March 4, 2001, the pro-Ethiopian-government Walta Information Centre reported an attack by the Eritrean Populär Democratie Liberation Front on Eritrean army contingents in the localities of Basebuba and Edeberusuma, with many casualties and the destruction of two vehicles. On June 18, 2001 , Eritrean state radio 26 announced a military action of the hitherto unknown Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front against Ethiopian government troops (always called 'Weyyane') in Angereb (in the Gondar area). As usual there could be no independent confirmation of these actions, and in 2002-3 little more was heard from these groups.
Opposition fronts also regularly give out statements supporting the cause of one or the other government. For example, on April 12, 2001, the Ethiopian weekly T'obbiya reported on a congress of the Afar National Liberation Movement (ANLM) which resolved to continue the "struggle against Eritrea to realise the Afar people's national unity and to enable Ethiopia to have its seaport Assab" (which is on ancestral Afar land). The status and origin of the ANLM is unclear. More recently, in March 2003, the new Eritrean opposition, Eritrean National Alliance (see below) formed in 2002, gave out statements in Addis Ababa on the removal of the Isayas regime, and even called for armed struggle. 27 The importance and impact of the proxy war factor in the Horn has thus declined somewhat since June 2000, when the Ethiopian army brought tihe war with Eritrea to an end by gaining a de facto victory. Before the final onslaught, the relevance of the respective proxies in Somalia or elsewhere had already been diminished because they were largely neutralised (the Somali al-Ittihad, the OLF). In addition, armed proxy groups of both countries, if not pushed back on the battlefield, were increasingly reined in by their patrons (for example, the Eritrean opposition groups by the Ethiopians), because they were not allowed to interfère with the new process of diplomacy.
Whether the décline of the proxy war factor will contribute to the building of a 'lasting peace' is not at all certain. The expérience of the last two years of tenuous negotiation after the Ethiopian-Eritrean war seems to show otherwise. The reining in of the proxy partners in the immédiate aftermath of the Algiers 2000 peace agreement appears to have been a temporary measure, to give the diplomatic process a chance. Now that this process has encountered serious hurdles and while the governments in place do not successfully address grievances of wide sections of their populations (notably the dismantling of the democratie process in Eritrea), the proxy conflict factor is resurging.
Proxy wars thus have a conjunctural life, being just one part of a larger strategy of regional hegemony used on and off -and when they stop, peace will not follow. Overall conditions -ecological, political and economie -are too volatile to allow for instant peace or stability. For instance, Ethiopia will continue to be active in protecting the national border, especially with Somalia, as long as there is no crédible or stable national government in place in that country. It will continue to support allies there, to prevent Somali and other groups infiltrating on its southern border. It is likely that Somali allies such as the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA) will continue to be advised and trained. In June 2001, a group of RRA people was sent back to Somalia after training in Ethiopia. 28 The Ethiopians also supported the 2001 formation of the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council, a coalition of militias, ex-warlords and factions opposed to the UN-sponsored and very shaky Transitional National Government in Mogadishu. It is also obvious that with the emerging obstacles in the border démarcation process with Eritrea, unrest through proxy parties is reawakening, as evident from Ethiopia's ostentatious support of some Eritrean opposition groups.
On the Eritrean side, there are deep grievances among followers of the banned opposition groups including ELF and the Kunama and Afar organisations. Member groups of an Alliance of Eritrean National Forces (AENF), set up in 1999, were active in the months of Ethiopian occupation of western Eritrea (Kunamaland) in June-July 2000, but they later retreated to Sudan, where a large part of their constituency lives in the Eritrean refugee camps (àbout 200 000 to 250 000). Judging from news coming out, the Kunama are probably the Eritrean people now in the most difficult situation. Owing to the devastating impact of the war, the ongoing land-grab by Tigrinya-speaking people (the mainstay of support for the government), and the apparent repression by the central government, they remain quite vulnérable. This situation may cause more instability.
In September-October 2002, a large conference of the Eritrean opposition coalition AENF (men renamed Eritrean National Alliance or ENA) was held in Addis Ababa. While this alliance is high on rhetoric but low on actual political, let alone military, strength and has resolved neither thé tensions between its 13 constituent groups nor the question of leadership, its prominently publicised gathering in Addis Ababa was a further sign of Ethiopian support for opposition movements against thé Eritrean régime in Asmara. The Eritrean government responded with a strong condemnation of what they saw as Ethiopia's policy "of contimûng war by proxy". 29 A négative and often underestimated impact of proxy war through thé above-mentioned smaller groups is thé disturbing influx and spread of all kinds of weapons. The state sponsors of thèse movements and factions hâve continued to arm them to further their perceived interests. Even Egypt, Libya and Yemen hâve joined in hère. Thèse arms not only circulated in thé battle zones of the war but found their way well beyond.
On What Does the Building of a So-Called Lasting Peace Dépend?
Ethiopian Prime Minister Mêles Zenawi has repeatedly suggested that a lasting peace in thé Horn is "impossible with thé présent government in Eritrea in place". On thé Eritrean side it is no secret that thé current président would like to see a différent régime in Addis Ababa (Gilkes and Flaut 1999:61-2) . Thus, if both sides are unwilling to make peace, it will not happen. Ultimately, however, one may even doubt whether me rwo leaders would be happy with the alternatives. Deep down there is a similarity of ideology and approach to politics. Eventually, a new kind of tacit alliance between thé (reformed) leading parties or élites in both countries stands a good chance of emerging, although in a much transformed shape. 30 They know that their ideology and programmes bave thé same source and run a more or less similar course. For instance, there are similarities in (post-Marxist) views on économie policy and on thé political process, and agreement -not shared by most of the Ethiopian opposition parties 31 -on thé highly debatable point of Eritrea having been a 'colony' of Ethiopia. It is also remarkable that at no point in thé war did thé Ethiopian leaders question thé right of Eritrea to possess thé port of Assab, although thé légal arguments and thé border démarcation based on the past international treaties and maps are far from clear, and thé war situation called many things into question. Thus one cannot discount thé possibility that, with différent personal leadership, new forms of co-operation between thèse two leading parties might indeed be revived.
Apart from such issues, one needs to look beyond thé personalised rancour and develop a vision for developing a businesslike working relationship between thé two countries. This will take time because thé sensé of betrayal and breach of trust is still deep and includes thé common people. But thé issue will eventually have to be taken up. It could start modestly with initiatives such as opening the border at selected Checkpoints for local trade and traffic; initiating the processing of compensation claims of thé war-affected people; 32 demilitarising thé border zones; allowing private trade relations, académie exchange, travel of citizens to visit family and/or friends across thé border and establishing periodic intra-regional contacts in a kind of 'standing conférence'. When thèse measures are implemented, support for proxy war stratégies will be de-emphasised. A général process of political reform and démocratisation in both countries would also create further conditions for rapprochement.
The only immédiate way forward is perhaps for the donor Community to stimulate further confidence-building measures and practical economie schemes of co-operation in thé framework of thé Inter-Governmental Authority on Development composed of thé Horn countries, or thé international bodies, and through developing cross-border initiatives within UN structures to rehabilitate and reconstruct war-affected zones and populations along thé border. The local people on both sides are related by culture, kinship and economie interests, and must find ways of daily interaction, market contacts and social relations. In thé long run this is inévitable, whatever thé two political regimes may state at present. An inclusive, future-oriented national policy that de-emphasises divisions along communal lines will be thé only prospect that will encourage people to work toward a more peaceful situation.
However, within today's networks of political mobilisation and transnational rebellions, thé movements involved in proxy wars will continue to exist, though in shifting and opportunistic alliances. One might also reconsider thé rôle of the what could be called 'diaspora proxy wars' which are being fought out in propaganda and (dis)information messages on thé dozens of internet sites (Guazzini 2001 for a remarkable study). Their impact should not be exaggerated, but thé rôle of diaspora communities active in Cyberspace has not been very constructive. Contributors hardly talk to each other, but tend to incriminate, accuse and offer extreme views and solutions. This is perhaps due to the well-known phenomenon of 'radicalisation at a distance': 33 well-educated elite groups who no longer have close contact with the home base or everyday life and daily dilemmas in the countries of origin (Ethiopia or Eritrea) can afford the luxury of uncompromising and principled ideological stands. This is also visible in Community meetings of ex-Ethiopians and ex-Eritreans abroad, which are often violently disturbed by opponents and have the character of sectarian infighting. A toning-down of diaspora proxy war would probably have a moderating effect on the political radicalisation of movements (most of which also have their own websites) engaged in actual proxy wars.
Some Conclusions
It is easy to make normative and prescriptive statements about the drama of the Horn of Africa and the culture of conflict there, but these will be without value if the spécifie realities of the région are not taken into account.
In the quest for explanations one has to analyse the long-term historical process as well as the dynamics of present-day political Systems unfolding within the constraints created by history and the ecological-economic problems of the area. The implications of proxy wars for governance should also be considered. Some years ago (1985) , the American sociologist Charles Tilly published an interesting chapter called "War-Making and State-Making as Organised Crime" to explain the antécédents of the émergence of national states in Europe and the shaky border line between the two phenomena of warfare and state formation. What hè called "coercive exploitation" and "protection rackets" played a major rôle in state-making in Europe. Far be it from me to suggest that we have to interpret the Horn of Africa in analogy with Tilly's article. But one has to recognise that state (re)formation and relentless power struggle usually occur in conditions of poverty, population pressure, environmental fragility and resource scarcity, resulting in (elite) compétition and exclusivist hegemonism. The inequalities of the global economy may add to the problems. Sometimes, however, political leaders in the région themselves appear to give the impression that their political strategy is somewhat akin to what Tilly called "organised crime". Political power and access to economie privilege for a limited group, buttressed by an inability to develop compromise politics on wider national issues, have to be defended at all costs, whereby the pursuing of policy with shady means and duplicitous schemes is not shunned. In some parts of Africa, states décline into private rackets of criminalised elites, for instance, in Zaire, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, parts of Nigeria, and Somalia.
Proxy war has often been a part of a state's strategy of survival. We may recognise its military and tactical advantages in the short run, and indeed alliances with semi-or illegal violent groups are quite common, as part of Machiavellian political manoeuvring, in many places. But in the Horn of Africa there is also a wider regional logic of power politics which continually impels leaders to search for proxies, be they ethnie, regional or religious-ideological allies. In a way, one might say that supporting proxy war is a predictable extension of a 'normal' diplomatic strategy of enhancing the national interest, with a variant on the old Clausewitz doctrine on war. Obviously it is always a risky strategy, dépendent on internai communal relations and the political strength of the state engaging in it. In today's international political System it is also less and less likely to succeed. Last but not least, if there is continued political stagnation, repression and éco-nomie crisis, some of thé erstwhile proxy war partners of both Eritrea and Ethiopia may become a real liability to their former patrons.
Stratégies to build a more 'lasting peace' include no doubt the gaining of international backing, a structure of inter-state consultations, developing transborder économie co-operation, and building of broad support among one's own national constituency. They will subvert thé need to look for armed proxy movements that foment unrest and do thé provoking and thé fighting. Modes of governance aimed at enhancing human security -in the economie, political and civic sense -seem vital. Institutional reform and démocratisation of the polity and cultivation of a more law-based, pluralist System of administration, with the possibility that a regime or a leader may step down after élections or might open up to multiparty participation and compromise politics, would be part of it. These things are perhaps a chimera in many parts of Africa under present conditions. There are no good prospects for Weberian-type states, owing to the problematic linkages between rulers and people, the precarious state of the économies, and the predatory links of the developed world and Africa in a globalising, not well-regulated, economy (Joseph 2003) . But policies that create conditions for a political culture of negotiation and compromise and the observing of elementary judicial raies of equity and justice -that often have a basis in traditional political culture -would enhance solutions. Some respect of rulers and donor countries for the historical and cultural continuities of African society would also help. In the populär clamour for reform and democratie change in Africa that occurred after the end of the Cold War, Africans have demanded attention to basic things such as proper management of the economy, and ways out of poverty and insecurity. But they also asked for, and still do want, respect for freedom of the person, the press, due process of law, and more social and political autonomy. Local constitutions in Ethiopia and Eritrea rhetorically proclaim such rights, but the state's practices and capabilities of governance do not sustain them. In the old néo-patrimonial tradition, elite groups have to serve their own régions, ethnie or clan constituencies, and in persistent conditions of scarcity and material insecurity they continually fear that their power position will be affected. This inhibits thé institutional system of power-sharing politics from taking root. In the Horn of Africa, we have to be patient indeed. Acknowledgement I am grateful for the detailed comments and suggestions on this paper by the anonymous JCAS réf-érée whose queries have allowed me to improve the paper, Needless to say, in various matters of interprétation, différences remain. Cabinet ministers have been made more subservient to the prime minister, and the leading party EPRDF was 'purged' of opponents after the March-April 2001 crisis (Paulos 2001) . In early 2003 there seemed to be a new central party in the making that would effectively dissolve the TPLF/EPRDF and create a national 'unity party'. 12. The UNMEE website never published a map of the operational area, in contrast to other UN peace-keeping missions. When contacted, the UNMEE spokespersons always claim that there is no map available. 13. As from October 2002 the new UN force commander is General Robert Gordon of the United Kingdom. 14. Which is indeed very difficult, owing to the shaky legal status of the so-called 'pertinent colonial treaties' mentioned in Article 4 of the December 8 Agreement between Ethiopian and Eritrea signed in Algiers. Without bilateral negotiations and a show of mutual goodwill there will not be a précise and acceptable border, even apart from the unsolved problem of Irob-land. See also Souba Hais 1998: www.geocities.com/~dagmawi/NewsJan99/Back-
Notes

